Articles by Our Attorneys

What happens if you are injured by an Uber or Lyft driver in Pennsylvania?

December 1, 2017 by Timothy F. Rayne, Esq.

Uber/Lyft car accident claims in Pennsylvania

The Uber and Lyft ride-sharing services have become immensely popular and have turned the world of transportation nearly upside down. I was in Washington D.C. earlier this year and suggested to my daughter that we get a taxi to dinner after a long day of walking the monuments. She laughed, pulled out her cell phone and, after a few keystrokes, announced that our Uber was booked and that we needed to be outside the hotel in two minutes.

Uber and Lyft are amazingly convenient and affordable services. But, what happens when something goes wrong, an accident happens and there are injuries? Is the driver liable? What insurance do the drivers have to carry to protect passengers? Do Uber and Lyft provide extra coverage?

Here are the general rules regarding legal issues after an Uber or Lyft accident:

Private Insurance Carried by the Driver and Coverage When App is Off

An Uber or Lyft driver is required to have car insurance and must inform his/her insurance company that she is a ridesharing driver. Because of the greater risk involved for the insurance company, the insurance rates for an Uber/Lyft driver will be higher than regular insurance rates.

Currently, an Uber/Lyft driver can chose his/her own private car insurance limits, that is how much insurance he/she will have to cover injuries and damages done to others. In Pennyslvania, minimum limits for injury are $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident and the minimum property damage liability coverage is $5,000. So, an Uber or Lyft driver may have low liability coverage limits. Those private insurance limits are the only coverage available when an Uber or Lyft driver is off duty and has the App off.

Uber/Lyft Supplemental Coverage

Both Uber and Lyft provide extra insurance coverage for their drivers that varies depending when an accident occurs that is when the App is on but no ride has been accepted and when the driver is en route or driving a paid passenger.

When App is On But No Trip Has Been Accepted

When the Uber or Lyft App is on but no trip has been accepted, both ridesharing services offer supplemental insurance that stacks on top of the driver’s policy. Specifically, the Uber/Lyft supplemental insurance covers $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident for injury and $25,000 for property damage. So, if for example, an Uber driver had the App on but had not accepted a trip and got distracted and accidentally struck a pedestrian, the driver’s insurance would pay up to the limits of coverage (which in PA could be as low as $15,000) and Uber’s supplemental insurance would pay up to $50,000.

Because of the danger presented by Uber/Lyft drivers driving while looking at their phones and trying to accept rides, it has been argued that this coverage is inadequate and should be increased.

When a Trip Has Been Accepted and/or the Rider is in the Vehicle

After an Uber/Lyft ride has been accepted and the driver is either en route to pick up the rider or the rider is in the vehicle, the supplemental insurance provided by Uber/Lyft is greatly increased. During that time period, the supplemental insurance is $1 Million for Liability, $1 Million for Uninsured/Underinsured Coverage and property damage coverage to pay up to the actual value of the property minus a small deductible.

The $1 Million Liability coverage protects anyone injured by the driver, whether that be a ride share passenger, the driver or passengers in another vehicle involved in the accident or a pedestrian.

The $1 Million Uninsured/Underinsured Coverage protects the driver of the Uber/Lyft car vehicle and any ride share passengers in the event that they are injured by a hit-and-run driver, a driver who had no insurance or a driver who had insufficient insurance to cover the injuries in the accident. In those cases, the $1 Million of Uninsured/Underinsured coverage is available to an injured driver or passenger.

For example, assume that an Uber passenger is catastrophically injured in an accident that was caused by another driver who ran a red light and crashed into the Uber vehicle and that driver only had a $15,000 Liability policy. In that case, the injured passenger could collect the $15,000 from the other driver’s insurance and then make an Underinsurance claim against the Uber policy for up to $1 Million. If the passenger’s injuries were worth more than that coverage, then the passenger could also make a claim for any Underinsurance coverage that he/she had on his/her personal car insurance policy. (As an aside, please make sure that you have Uninsured/Underinsured coverage of at least $100,000 and preferably much more on your car insurance policy.)

Viability of Claims in Excess of the Uber/Lyft Supplemental Insurance

In truly catastrophic injury cases that have damages in excess of the $1 Million supplemental coverage, litigation has been filed against Uber/Lyft and its drivers for negligence seeking additional compensation. Those cases are complicated because Uber/Lyft argue that its drivers are independent contractors rather than employees. Each case should be evaluated by an experienced car accident lawyer to determine whether or not there is an opportunity to recover more than the driver’s insurance and the Uber/Lyft supplemental insurance.

To schedule a free consultation and learn more about your rights, contact Pennsylvania car accident lawyer Tim Rayne at 610-840-0124 or [email protected], or check out Tim’s website at www.timraynelaw.com. Tim has over twenty years of experience helping injured accident victims receive fair treatment from insurance companies. Tim has an advanced Master’s Degree in Trial Advocacy and is Board Certified by the National Board of Trial Advocacy. Tim regularly practices in Chester County, with offices in Kennett Square and West Chester. He also helps clients with cases in neighboring counties, including Bucks County, Delaware County, Lancaster County, Montgomery County and Philadelphia County.

Read: Ten Steps to Follow if You Are Injured in a Car Accident in Pennsylvania

Navigating Zoning in the Age of Airbnb

November 22, 2017 by Matthew M. McKeon, Esq.

Over the last ten years, there has been an enormous increase in the use of online rental marketplaces such as Airbnb and HomeAway, which allow people to list their house, apartment, or other residential dwelling for rent as a short-term accommodation. In Pennsylvania and Delaware, state and municipal governments are examining the implications of the proliferation of these transitory residents. Some municipalities permit (and tax) short-term rentals of residential dwellings, whereas other municipalities prohibit them. For this reason, anyone seeking to rent out a residential dwelling on a short-term basis should thoroughly understand how their municipality defines and regulates this type of rental.

In municipalities that permit short-term rentals of residential dwellings, such rentals are often still subject to any number of procedures and restrictions. For example, Philadelphia only allows such short-term rentals if the rentals are arranged by a “booking agent,” which is defined to include platforms like Airbnb and HomeAway. Any overnight rentals of residential dwellings are subject to the city’s 8.5% hotel tax. Additionally, the primary resident of a dwelling must obtain a use permit if he or she rents the dwelling for more than 90 days per year; however, a dwelling cannot be used for short-term rentals for more than 180 days total per year or more than 30 consecutive days per year. If the lessor is not the primary resident of the property, the lessor must obtain a rental license. Municipalities are not the only entities seeking to regulate and tax short-term rentals: in June 2017, a bill was introduced in the Delaware House of Representatives that would extend the state’s 8% lodging tax to short-term rentals of rooms, entire dwelling units, and campgrounds.

Although Pennsylvania law permits municipalities to prohibit these short-term rentals, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has held that they cannot do so unless their zoning ordinances comprehend and expressly prohibit this new and distinct form of commercial accommodation. In one case, the owner of a single-family home in Pocono Township’s residential zoning district used her home as her primary residence and rented out the entire home during weekends by listing it on HomeAway. The zoning hearing board determined that her rentals constituted a “lodge” use, which was prohibited in the zoning district. The owner appealed to the court of common pleas, which affirmed. The Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that the township could not bar the owner’s rental of her home where the zoning ordinance’s definition of “single-family dwelling” did not prohibit the activity. Additionally, the Court noted that the activity did not fit the definition of “lodge” or any other use that was prohibited in the zoning district.

Similarly, the owners of a single-family home located in a residential zoning district of Stroud Township listed the property on Airbnb for short-term rental. The zoning hearing board determined that the rental activity was a prohibited “tourist home” use and thus violated the zoning ordinance. The court of common pleas affirmed the zoning hearing board. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that the zoning ordinance’s definition of “single-family dwelling” did not prohibit the owners’ rental activity and that the activity did not fit the definition of the prohibited “tourist home” use.

These cases show that those wishing to use their residential dwelling for short-term rentals must check the applicable zoning regulations. They must understand whether the zoning ordinance expressly bars short-term rentals in their zoning district. They should also understand how the zoning ordinance defines other types of commercial accommodations prohibited in the zoning district – and be prepared to differentiate their rentals from those prohibited types of accommodations.

The opinions expressed in this article are for general information purposes only and are not intended to provide specific legal advice. Matthew M. McKeon can be reached at 610.840.0225 or [email protected].

Modifying Irrevocable Trusts: Answers to Common Questions

November 16, 2017 by Isaac J. Jean-Pierre, Esq.

An irrevocable trust is defined as a trust that cannot be terminated by the settlor once it is created. As such, a trustee or beneficiary may be under the impression that once the trust is created, the terms of the trust remain intact in perpetuity. In reality, that is not necessarily the case, and this article serves to address some common concerns that may arise when exploring the possibility of modifying or terminating a non-charitable irrevocable trust.

By way of background, a settlor is one who establishes the trust, the trustee is one who has legal title to property and holds it for the benefit of a beneficiary, and the beneficiary is the one to whom the trustee owes fiduciary duties.

Can I modify or terminate an irrevocable trust without going to court?

Under Pennsylvania law, a trust terminates when it expires pursuant to its terms, the trust no longer has a purpose to achieve, or the trust’s purposes have become illegal or contrary to public policy.[1] Moreover, a non-charitable irrevocable trust may be modified or terminated upon the consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries even if the modification or termination is inconsistent with the material purpose of the trust.[2]

An example of a material purpose is a spendthrift provision, which is language in a trust that prohibits a beneficiary’s interest from being assigned and generally prevents creditors from attaching a beneficiary’s interest, is presumed to constitute a material purpose of the trust.[3]

Another example of a material purpose would involve a trust established for the purpose of ensuring the payment of a child’s college tuition. If the child beneficiary, acting without the settlor, sought to terminate the trust because they have turned eighteen years old, the termination would be invalid since, assuming the child has not attended college much sooner than expected, the purpose of the trust has not been fulfilled.

Further, while a settlor’s ability to consent to a trust modification or termination may be exercised by a guardian or an agent under the settlor’s power of attorney, the settlor cannot represent a trust beneficiary in the modification or termination of a trust.[4]

In the event where an irrevocable trust is terminated, the trustee must distribute the trust property in a manner that is consistent with the beneficiaries’ wishes.

What if the settlor is unable to take part in the modification or termination of the trust?

In cases where the settlor is not a party to the modification of an irrevocable trust, the approval of the court will be required, and approval will only be granted in cases where the court concludes that the modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust and all the trust beneficiaries agree to a modification.[5] To terminate an irrevocable trust in the absence of a settlor, all of the beneficiaries must agree to the termination, and the court must determine that continuing the trust is not necessary to achieving any material purpose of the trust.[6]

What if all the beneficiaries do not agree to a modification or termination of the trust?

In a perfect world, modifications to any legal arrangement would be made in a stress-free manner. Unfortunately, plans do not always turn out as originally expected. Fortunately, the statute provides that, in cases where all the beneficiaries do not consent to a modification or termination of the trust, the modification or termination may still occur through court approval only where the court determines that:

(1) if all the beneficiaries had consented, the trust could have been modified or terminated and

(2) the interest of non-consenting beneficiaries will receive adequate protection.

What if the trustee objects to the modification or termination of the trust?

Under the statutory section governing modifications and terminations of trusts, such changes can be made despite a trustee’s objection.[7] However, under the section governing the proceedings for the termination or modification of trusts, the trustee has standing to object to a proposed termination or modification.[8]

Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that a trustee’s objection to a trust’s modification or termination is not tantamount to a denial of the proposed modification or termination.

What steps can I take moving forward?

In order to determine that the purposes of an irrevocable trust continue to be served in an ever-changing environment, it is never too early to consult your attorney, especially since they will be in the best position to give you specific legal advice and recommendations that are specifically tailored to a specific situation and set of circumstances.

The opinions expressed in this article are for general information purposes only and are not intended to provide specific legal advice or recommendations. To learn more about how to modify or terminate a non-charitable irrevocable trust in Pennsylvania, please contact Isaac J. Jean-Pierre at 610.840.0273 or [email protected].

[1] 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740(a)
[2] 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740.1(a)
[3] 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740(b.1)
[4] Id.
[5] 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740.1(b)
[6] Id.
[7] 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740.1 (comment)
[8] 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740(b)

Business Valuation in a Pennsylvania Divorce: Consideration of Sale Costs And Tax Effect

September 21, 2017 by Ashley B. Stitzer, Esq.

Valuation of marital assets is often a key dispute in divorce proceedings, particularly when a martial business is to be distributed. The Divorce Code does not provide a specific method for valuing assets and trial courts are given broad discretion when determining equitable distribution. However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recently reiterated that consideration of the expenses and tax ramifications of a sale or liquidation of a marital asset is appropriate when awarding the asset in equitable distribution, regardless of whether a sale or liquidation of the asset was intended.

The Pennsylvania Divorce Code identifies a non-exclusive list of factors for the Court’s consideration when determining equitable division of marital property. Two identified factors are the Federal, State and local tax ramifications and the expenses of sale, transfer or liquidation associated with the asset. The statutory language states that the tax ramifications and sale, transfer or liquidation expenses “need not be immediate and certain.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(10.1) and(10.2).

Although the language in the equitable division statute provides that tax ramifications and sale expenses are relevant considerations, the statute does not mandate that taxes and expenses be deducted from the determined value when awarding an asset. When interpreting this statutory language, trial courts have determined the value of a marital asset without deduction of the tax ramifications and expenses associated with a sale or liquidation when there is evidence that a sale or liquidation is not anticipated.

Equity is best served by consideration of the tax effect and sale and liquidation costs when awarding an asset in equitable distribution regardless of whether a sale or liquidation is anticipated.

In a recent decision in Carney v. Carney, —A.3d —, 2017 WL 2952913 (Pa. Super., July 11, 2017), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reiterated that deduction of tax ramifications and sale expenses was the fair and just method for valuation of the asset even if a sale or liquidation was not contemplated in the divorce. In Carney, the trial court distributed the marital business solely to husband, without consideration of costs associated with a potential sale of the business, and then equalized the distribution to husband by requiring husband to compensate wife through interest free monthly payments. The trial court dismissed husband’s argument that the award of the business should be tax effected. The trial court reasoned that it was not required to apply a tax effect value to any of the marital assets because there was no evidence that the parties intended to sell any of the assets.

On appeal, the Superior Court reviewed its prior decision in Balicki v. Balicki, 4 A.3d 654 (Pa.Super. 2010), in which the Superior Court rejected the argument that expenses and tax ramifications associated with the sale, transfer, or liquidation of a marital asset are only relevant in an equitable distribution determination if a sale of the asset is likely because the argument violates the clear language in the statute that tax ramifications and sale or liquidation expenses “need not be immediate and certain.” The Superior Court noted the clear legislative intent to stop the practice of the lower courts analyzing the prospect of sale of an asset and that the assets simply be given the value they would have at distribution after deducting every expense necessary to achieve liquidation. Balicki, 4 A.3d at 64 (citations omitted).

Reiterating its reasoning in Balicki, the Carney Court observed that the trial court’s equitable distribution order provided husband with the entire business, which could not be converted to cash without significant expense associated with a sale process, while wife would receive monthly payments of cash without equivalent expenses. The Superior Court held that the trial court erred in failing to account for the costs associated with the potential sale of the business before assigning the asset to husband and remanded the case on the issue.

Thus, the Superior Court has made clear that equity is best served by consideration of the tax effect and sale and liquidation costs when awarding an asset in equitable distribution regardless of whether a sale or liquidation is anticipated. Indeed, if the assets were sold through the divorce proceedings, the parties would realize and share the tax and sale expense consequences. To find otherwise may provide a windfall to one party through receipt of tax free asset transfers in equitable distribution if the other party cannot realize the value of an asset transfer without sale expense and tax liabilities attached.

Ashley B. Stitzer is a family law attorney representing men and women in all aspects of family law matters, including divorce, alimony/spousal support, equitable distribution and property division, marital agreements, child support and child custody. From custody disputes and support issues to complex divorce and property division, Ashley takes a direct, personal approach to resolving each client’s family law concerns and prides herself on being thorough, passionate and laser-focused on her clients’ needs. Ashley also has significant experience from prior practice representing businesses in corporate bankruptcy matters which she utilizes regularly in her representation of high net worth clients in divorce proceedings, including representations involving business valuation and employee stock ownership plans. If you’d like to schedule a consultation with Ashley, feel free to email her at [email protected] or call her at 610-840-0243.

Why are Powers of Attorney so Important?

September 11, 2017 by Kristen R. Matthews, Esq.

I stress to my clients of all ages the importance of having valid Powers of Attorney in place. I recommend that all clients have a Healthcare Power of Attorney and a General Durable Power of Attorney. The Healthcare Power of Attorney appoints a Healthcare Agent who will make your medical decisions on your behalf if you are unable to effectively communicate with your medical providers. The General Durable Power of Attorney appoints a General Agent who will manage all non-healthcare decisions on your behalf including tasks such as signing documents, filing taxes, and bill payment.

If an individual becomes incapacitated (i.e. unable to manage his or her financial and/or medical affairs) the Power of Attorney Agent is empowered to act on the incapacitated individual’s behalf. The problem arises when the incapacitated individual never executed Powers of Attorney while he or she possessed the capacity to do so. In such a situation, a Guardianship will be required.

A Petition to seek Guardianship of an incapacitated person can be brought by any party who has an interest in the well-being of the incapacitated person. In many cases, a spouse or close family member will petition for Guardianship. In other cases where there may not be a spouse or close family member, or perhaps a contentious or hostile situation surrounds the incapacitated person, an independent third party organization may seek guardianship.

The procedure for appointing a Guardian can be time-consuming and costly. A doctor must perform a medical examination of the alleged incapacitated person to establish that he or she is in fact incapacitated. Even in situations where a spouse or family member is seeking guardianship, the Court will often appoint an independent attorney to represent the incapacitated person’s interests. A Guardianship requires the formalities of notice to all interested parties, including the incapacitated person, and a hearing before an Orphans Court judge.

It is important to remember that although guardianships have an important role in estate litigation and in some cases are absolutely necessary, they can almost always be avoidable by having an attorney prepare for you valid General Durable and Healthcare Powers of Attorney.

Kristen R. Matthews works closely with individuals on a wide variety of estate and trust planning and administration matters. She is an experienced elder law attorney and assists clients with matters including advance and crisis Medicaid planning, guardianships, special needs trusts, and Veterans Pension benefits. To learn more about Kristen’s practice email her at [email protected], or call her at 610-840-0272.

Cryogenics and Divorce: When Science Outpaces the Law

July 14, 2017 by Adam H. Tanker, Esq.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in 2012 alone, there were 65,000 births in the United States resulting from assisted reproduction technology, (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology. 2012 Assisted Reproductive Technology National Summary Report. Atlanta: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; 2014). Although in vitro fertilization, the external fertilization of the egg and subsequent implantation of the fertilized egg into the mother’s uterus, has been utilized for a number of years, the development of cryogenic techniques has added a new dimension. Instead of immediate implantation of the fertilized egg, it is allowed to grow to an embryo of a certain size and is then frozen. The frozen fertilized embryo (FFE) can be maintained in cryogenic storage for a long period of time until it is thawed and implanted into a uterus.

The existence of a FFE in the context of a divorce presents complicated ethical and policy questions of reproductive rights that have not been answered by legislators or the courts. Cryopreservation injects into divorce proceedings the issue of whether one partner’s right to reproduce and the FFE’s right to life outweigh the other partner’s reproductive and privacy rights. Currently there are no federal regulations governing the disposition of FFE’s and states have struggled, but have thus far, failed to enact legislation addressing the use and treatment of FFEs.

Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an FFE case, making it clear that it would be leaving the state courts and legislatures to decide how to treat and classify the embryo, and to weigh rights of the parties in Szafraski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. Ct. App. 2015) cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1230 (2016).

A review of recent state court decisions shows that there are three basic approaches employed in FFE cases; the contractual approach, the contemporaneous mutual consent approach and the balancing approach.

The contractual approach views the embryos strictly as property, and looks at whether the parties had previously reached an agreement about the disposition of the embryos. If so, the court will enforce this as it would any other contract and defer to the terms of the agreement, which ostensibly reflects the wishes of the parties at the time they reached the agreement.

The contemporaneous mutual consent approach allows either party to change his or her mind until the FFEs are used or destroyed. It differs from the contractual approach, which holds the parties to their initial contractual decisions regardless of any future change of heart.

The final approach is the balancing approach, where the court applies its own judgment to weigh the relative interests of the parties in order to determine the optimal outcome, regardless of any previous contracts between the parties.

In Szafraski, the Cook County Circuit Court held that a signed implied consent form provided by the fertility clinic, did not modify or supersede the oral contract they made whereby Dunston (the wife) was entitled to use the embryos to have a child, without limitation. As a result, Dunston was awarded custody of the embryos. The trial court chose to utilize the balancing approach, finding that Dunston’s interest in the embryos was superior to Szafraski’s interest in having her not use the embryos.

On appeal, the appellate court developed a hybrid approach which gave import to the contractual approach but, in the absence of a verbal or written agreement, would allow for a balancing of the parties’ interests. It then remanded the case to the trial court for an application of this approach. The trial court found a prior verbal agreement between the parties to create the embryos constituted an “oral contract” and supported Dunston’s position. The court expressly rejected Szafranski’s argument that the informed consent document supplied by the fertility clinic (which stated that the embryos could not be used unless both parties were in agreement) modified or superseded their oral contract. Interestingly, the appellate court made it clear that had it strictly applied the balancing approach, the outcome would have been the same. The court held that Dunston’s interest in using the FFEs is “paramount considering her inability to have a biological child by any other means”

The ruling in Szafraski, however, is not typical. Usually, one party’s right not to procreate has been considered to override the other’s right to procreate. Several state courts have recently made rulings relative to the use of FFE’s. In all but three cases, state courts have held in favor of the party who did not want the FFEs implanted, as in Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), (If no prior agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using or not using the pre-embryos must be weighed. Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998), (embryos ordered to be destroyed as an agreement between the two biological donors regarding disposition of their pre-embryo is presumed valid and binding and should be enforced in the case of a dispute); J.B. v. M.B.,783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001), (the wife’s fundamental right to not procreate mandated destruction of the pre-embryos in light of the husband’s continuing ability to procreate with a different partner); McQueen v. Gadsberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App 2016), (ordering that no transfer, release, or use of the frozen embryos shall occur without the signed authorization of both parties.); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tx.Ct. App. 2006), (holding that an embryo agreement which provided for destruction in the event of divorce was valid contract and embryos were ordered to be destroyed).

Illinois, Maryland and Pennsylvania courts have ruled that in cases where the FFE is the only chance for a woman to have a biological child, the desire of the woman to have said child prevailed over the other parties’ desire not to have a child, Szafraski, supra.; Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa Super. 2012), Mbah v. Anong, CAD11-11394, (Md. Circ. Ct., 7th Jud. Dist. 2012).

In Reber, Pennsylvania decided its first case dealing with the disposition of FFEs in the context of a divorce. In its approach, the Superior Court employed a hybrid analysis similar to that of the Illinois analysis.

The Superior Court first examined the language of the informed consent the parties signed with respect to the storage of the FFEs. The husband’s position was that the agreement required the destruction of the FFEs at the end of three years; however, the court ruled that the agreement was actually between the parties and the cryopreservation facility, rather than an agreement between husband and wife to destroy the FFEs. Next, the court engaged in a balance of the interests analysis. After reviewing the wife’s interest in procreation compared to the husband’s interest to avoid unwanted procreation, the Court ruled that the wife was entitled to possess and use the FFE’s to bear children since the FFE’s represented the wife’s only opportunity to have a child.

In the early years of American jurisprudence, Thomas Jefferson recognized that “laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times,” The papers of Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson to H. Tompkinson (AKA Samuel Kercheval), July 12, 1816. It is clear that the law has not kept pace with scientific advancements in the area of assisted reproduction technology.

Without a clear legal consensus, individuals cannot have any reasonable expectations about their legal rights when it comes to FFEs. The unfortunate consequence of all of this is that, until the legal uncertainty related to the issue is resolved, family planning using FFE’s will involve the risk that one partner may lose control over the implantation of FFE’s against his or her own personal wishes. Until legislatures enact statutory law on point and the U.S. Supreme Court weighs in, state courts and litigants will continue to struggle to resolve these issues.

Adam H. Tanker is an attorney at MacElree Harvey. Tanker focuses his practice on all aspects of family law matters including fertility agreements, alimony/spousal support, divorce, equitable distribution, marital agreements, child support and child custody. Adam can be reached at [email protected] or 215-309-4021.

What happens if you are injured by an Uber or Lyft driver in Pennsylvania?

Private Insurance Carried by the Driver and Coverage When App is Off

Uber/Lyft Supplemental Coverage

When App is On But No Trip Has Been Accepted

When a Trip Has Been Accepted and/or the Rider is in the Vehicle

Viability of Claims in Excess of the Uber/Lyft Supplemental Insurance

Navigating Zoning in the Age of Airbnb

Modifying Irrevocable Trusts: Answers to Common Questions

Can I modify or terminate an irrevocable trust without going to court?

What if the settlor is unable to take part in the modification or termination of the trust?

What if all the beneficiaries do not agree to a modification or termination of the trust?

What if the trustee objects to the modification or termination of the trust?

What steps can I take moving forward?

Business Valuation in a Pennsylvania Divorce: Consideration of Sale Costs And Tax Effect

Equity is best served by consideration of the tax effect and sale and liquidation costs when awarding an asset in equitable distribution regardless of whether a sale or liquidation is anticipated.

Why are Powers of Attorney so Important?

Cryogenics and Divorce: When Science Outpaces the Law

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Articles by Our Attorneys

Private Insurance Carried by the Driver and Coverage When App is Off

Uber/Lyft Supplemental Coverage

When App is On But No Trip Has Been Accepted

When a Trip Has Been Accepted and/or the Rider is in the Vehicle

Viability of Claims in Excess of the Uber/Lyft Supplemental Insurance

Can I modify or terminate an irrevocable trust without going to court?

What if the settlor is unable to take part in the modification or termination of the trust?

What if all the beneficiaries do not agree to a modification or termination of the trust?

What if the trustee objects to the modification or termination of the trust?

What steps can I take moving forward?

Equity is best served by consideration of the tax effect and sale and liquidation costs when awarding an asset in equitable distribution regardless of whether a sale or liquidation is anticipated.

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